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Note 
For the Children: Intentional and Functional 
Approaches to Same-Sex Parentage in Connecticut 
HANNAH KALICHMAN 
Despite major progress that Connecticut has made in recent years towards 
achieving marriage equality, there is still a large disparity in the legal treatment of 
Connecticut parents based on their sexual orientation. Many family law doctrines 
regarding parentage are entrenched in “traditional” heteronormative definitions of 
marriage and family, despite changes in the legal recognition of marriage. 
Furthermore, certain doctrines, such as the presumption of legitimacy, maintain the 
narrative of a child only belonging to one mother and one father in the context of a 
marriage. Understandings of what it means to be a family are shifting. In 2019, the 
adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017 was proposed in the Connecticut 
General Assembly. Unfortunately, the legislation died in committee. The Uniform 
Parentage Act would eliminate many barriers that same-sex parents face, such as 
replacing gendered statutory language such as “mother” or “father” with simply 
“parent.” The Act would also provide a regulatory structure through which 
definitions of parentage could be broadened to include functional and intentional 
parents within Connecticut’s statutory scheme. This Note argues that current 
constructions of parentage in society are far too limited and often do more harm to 
the child than good. Therefore, this Note advocates for the adoption of the Uniform 
Parentage Act of 2017 in Connecticut. Particularly, this Note outlines the benefits 
of expanding the legal definition of parent to include more modern realities of family 
formation such as those who were intended to be parents to a child and those who 
functioned as a parent in the child’s life. Furthermore, this Note was written with 
future Connecticut legislation in mind and therefore seeks to provide a broad 
overview of the history and legal doctrine of marriage as well as the practical 
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For the Children: Intentional and Functional 
Approaches to Same-Sex Parentage in Connecticut 
HANNAH KALICHMAN * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is four years since the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 effectively invalidating state laws that, for 
decades, denied marriage equality to same-sex couples.2 With a five-justice 
majority, this landmark decision brought about strong social and political 
reactions from both affirming and opposing groups.3 While the 2015 ruling 
fundamentally changed marital rights across the country, Connecticut has 
fully recognized same-sex marriages since its 2008 decision Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health.4 The recognition of same-sex marriages, 
while an important development in American jurisprudence, was not enough 
to truly bring same-sex couples to an equal status with different-sex 
couples.5 This recognition, whether it be at the national or state level, 
promptly brings a myriad of questions, such as: How does insurance 
regulation apply to same-sex couples? What are spousal rights in health and 
medical care? How does redefining marital rights impact social and legal 
                                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Connecticut School of Law. Recipient of the Best Student 
Note Award. I would like to thank Professor Schmeiser for her unwavering support and advice 
throughout this process. Also, thank you to Professor Chill for guiding me through law school and 
sparking my interest in child law. I would also like to thank the members of Connecticut Law Review for 
their tireless efforts and dedication. Thank you to my family and friends for their constant 
encouragement. Specifically, thank you to my father, Seth, for instilling in me a passion to write from a 
young age and to my mother, Moira, for teaching me to how to be an advocate.  
1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 Id. at 2607. 
3 Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 
1209 (2016). 
4 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).  
5 Throughout this Note, I will be referring to “same-sex” couples as an umbrella term to include 
couples who identify as being of the same sex or gender. It is important to recognize that not all same-
sex or LGBTQ+ experiences are the same. While this Note references same-sex couples generally, 
lesbian couples and gay-men couples have different experiences, as do individuals who do not identify 
within the binary of male or female or who identify as trans*. For a full discussion regarding the 
disparities in experiences for same-sex couples, see Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: 
Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 267 (2009). 
To give an example, gay men are generally less likely to be able to adopt than lesbian couples. Id. at 268. 
For the purposes of this Note, I will discuss same-sex couples more broadly, as the proposed functional 
and intentional parentage definitions would perhaps address some of the disparities amongst same-sex 
couples through gender neutral legislative language. 
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definitions of family? More specifically, how are parental rights and custody 
disputes impacted in the recognition of same-sex couples? 
This Note aims to address same-sex parental rights and child custody in 
Connecticut. While courts and legislatures have asserted that by legalizing 
same-sex marriages they are declaring all married couples to be equal under 
the law, the reality experienced by many families is starkly different. Those 
who do not fit within the societally constructed categories of traditional 
gender roles and norms often find significant obstacles in their path when 
seeking parentage.6 Connecticut has attempted to sort out the question of 
same-sex couples’ rights to children born during and outside of matrimony.7 
Thus far, these attempts have fallen short of achieving truly equal treatment 
for all families.  
This Note examines the historical background of the various doctrines 
associated with the institutions of marriage, parentage, and child custody. 
Limited legal avenues are available to same-sex couples seeking parentage. 
Beyond biology, there are currently two main routes to parentage: (1) 
prearranged agreements such as adoption or surrogacy and (2) marriage to a 
woman who bears a child. The latter occurs through the presumption of 
legitimacy or marital presumption. This presumption grants parental rights 
to the partner, historically the husband, of a woman who bears a child.8 
Courts and legislatures alike continue to grapple with the presumption of 
legitimacy and related questions of parentage in the context of same-sex 
couples. Questions surrounding what defines a parent and how parentage is 
established under the law are complex and deeply personal. The challenge 
behind applying this presumption is the inherent case-by-case nature of 
family law questions. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a historical overview 
of marriage and family in the United States, specifically elaborating a broad, 
and admittedly abridged, national history of how civil rights, marriage, and 
parentage have developed within their respective doctrines over the years. 
In her comprehensive book, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the 
Nation, Nancy Cott provides extensive insight into the national history of 
marriage.9 However, this Note does not attempt to cover every aspect of 
marital history, but instead seeks to provide a sufficient overview of the 
evolution of marital legislation and jurisprudence so as to set the backdrop 
for further analysis. Part II discusses traditional models of defining 
parentage and their shortcomings when applied to same-sex couples. Part III 
                                                                                                                     
6 Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2266 (2017).  
7 Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 
2015).  
8 Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1190 
(2016). 
9 For a comprehensive account of the history of marriage in the United States, see generally NANCY 
F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000). 
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specifically addresses the rights of same-sex couples and current routes to 
parentage in Connecticut. Part IV introduces the Uniform Parentage Act and 
its application in other states, as well as Connecticut’s own steps toward 
adopting it. Part IV also provides two proposals for legislative change in 
Connecticut.  
Instead of relying on antiquated doctrines, such as the presumption of 
legitimacy, that are ill-fitted for modern definitions of family, this Note calls 
for the implementation of intentional and functional definitions of parentage. 
Specifically, Connecticut should adopt relevant provisions of the Uniform 
Parentage Act (2017) (UPA (2017)),10 so as to finally have a comprehensive 
legal scheme through which to define parentage. The writing of this Note is 
particularly timely given the recent attention that the UPA (2017) has 
garnered in the Connecticut legislature.11 While no bill is currently on the 
floor as of the writing of this Note, it was with potential legislation in mind 
that this Note was constructed. Hopefully, the following discussion will 
contribute to Connecticut’s legislative process in considering whether to 
adopt certain provisions of the UPA (2017).  
It is time for Connecticut law to recognize same-sex relationships as 
legitimate beyond a marriage license and fully deserving of recognition and 
protection under the law when seeking legal parentage. No longer is it 
sufficient to fit same-sex parents into the margins, including them via proxy 
and stretching outdated doctrine to fit their situation, as if they were an 
exception to the norm. Same-sex couples are fully capable parents and 
should be recognized as such.12 With implementation of the UPA (2017) 
provisions in Connecticut, parentage would no longer be limited to the 
notion that a parent is someone who has passed on genetic material to their 
offspring. Instead, there would be a recognition of the role of the parent, the 
importance of the parent-child relationship, and a true focus on the best 
interests and welfare of the child.  
I. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY: A NATIONAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Marriage and family, while fundamentally private aspects of life, 
undeniably thrust individuals into the public sphere. Marriage in the United 
States, and by extension family, have been repeatedly described as central 
to society.13 Courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have 
                                                                                                                     
10 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
11 Until February 2019, Connecticut had a bill, Proposed Bill No. 6507, in committee that outlined 
the adoption of the UPA (2017). Proposed H.B. No. 6507 Session Year 2019, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_num=HB06507&whi
ch_year=2019 (last visited Jan. 4, 2020). 
12 William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s 
Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 103–04 (2005).  
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struggled to come to terms with a definition of family that is both clear and 
flexible to meet the modern legal needs and rights of individuals. 
Historically, a family was defined strictly in the nuclear sense, being 
comprised of a husband, wife, and their legitimate children.14 This 
traditional definition has proven problematic as families have morphed 
beyond such a narrow conceptualization, especially in recent years.15 Within 
the family structure, other definitions have shifted as legal doctrines have 
evolved. Both the doctrines of marriage and family are still changing. For 
example, marriage no longer defines women as the property of men and 
marital rape has only recently been recognized as a crime within American 
penal codes.16  
A. A Brief History of Marriage in the United States 
Marriage, while a personal declaration of love and commitment between 
individuals, is also influenced by public attitudes and acceptance.17 Since the 
founding of the nation, marriage has been deeply entrenched in the national 
narrative.18 Marriage sets boundaries for the roles prescribed to men and 
women, culturally defines gender, and determines the very make-up of 
families.19 Not only has marriage law defined gender, it also has had a major 
role in defining race and drawing racial distinctions between groups.20 Some 
marriages, such as those between Christian white men and white women, 
have traditionally been protected whereas marriages outside of this narrow 
construct have a history of being discouraged or banned.21 Marital regulation 
draws stark lines defining what makes a legitimate family.22  
Even in times of radical social change, from reconstruction to the Civil 
Rights Movement, advocates did not dare go so far as to challenge the 
institution of marriage and its inherent assumptions. For instance, during the 
formation and passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, advocates were sure 
to clarify that the language would not eliminate “other domestic relations.”23 
It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court held that states 
                                                                                                                     
14 See id. at 25 (describing nuclear family structures in America dating back to the Iroquois Nation). 
15 Brief of Historians of Marriage & American Historical Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 4–6, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). See also Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (holding grandparents should be included in “family”). 
16 COTT, supra note 9, at 211.  
17 Id. at 2. 
18 See id. at 9–10 (describing the various definitions of marriage in the United States during its 
founding with the underpinning of acceptance and expectation that marriage be between a man and a 
woman).  
19 Id. at 4. 
20 See id. (“Consequently, marriage has also been instrumental in articulating and structuring 
distinctions grouped under the name of ‘race.’”).  
21 COTT, supra note 9, at 3–5. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 80. 
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could no longer restrict marriages between persons solely on the basis of 
their race.24 By opining that this was a violation of both the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was 
singling marriage out as a “fundamental freedom” that was implicit in the 
concept of liberty.25 Specifically, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court held that 
“[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very 
existence and survival . . . . Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, 
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot 
be infringed by the State.”26  
While Loving proved to be some measure of legal protection for 
interracial couples seeking to marry, the same cannot be said for same-sex 
couples. Until 1973, homosexuality was defined as a mental illness.27 As late 
as 2003, states were still allowed to criminalize sexual behavior associated 
with same-sex relationships, particularly sexual acts between men.28 
Reminiscent of the efforts of former slaves after the Civil War, same-sex 
couples sought the legal recognition of marriage in part to demonstrate their 
access to basic civil rights.29 By excluding same-sex couples from free 
choice and equal marriages, same-sex relationships were stigmatized and 
heterosexual supremacy was reinforced.30 Despite the lack of legal 
protections for same-sex relationships, the decades following the 1960s 
demonstrated major shifts in household demographics.31 Along with these 
shifts in social structure came movement in some states towards recognizing 
same-sex marriages under the principles of consent, freedom of choice, and 
privacy.32 
                                                                                                                     
24 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (overruling Pace v. Alabama, which upheld the 
State of Alabama’s ban on interracial marriages).  
25 Id. 
26 Id. (citation omitted). 
27 Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 565, 565 (2015). 
28 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that a law criminalizing sodomy 
was constitutional and met rational basis review). Lawrence v. Texas held that the liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of consenting adults 
to engage in intimate contact in the privacy of their own homes and that this right extended to same-sex 
couples. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
29 COTT, supra note 9, at 216. 
30 Rosky, supra note 5, at 273–74 n.77. 
31 Unmarried couple households multiplied by almost ten times from 1960 to 1998, growing more 
than five times faster than the number of households overall. However, by the end of the 1990s, marriage 
no longer was the society milestone it once was considered to be. The proportion of adults declining to 
marry rose from fifteen to twenty-three percent between 1972 and 1998. COTT, supra note 9, at 203. 
32 In 1998, an Alaskan court ruled that the right to choose one’s life partner is constitutionally 
fundamental under the state constitution. The court held that: 
Government intrusion into the choice of a life partner encroaches on the intimate 
personal decisions of the individual. . . . The relevant question is not whether same-
sex marriage is so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right . . . but whether 
the freedom to choose one’s life partner is so rooted in our traditions. 
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Just as the first states, namely Alaska and Hawaii, began to broaden their 
definitions of marriage to include same-sex couples, opponents of same-sex 
marriage organized to maintain the heteronormative boundaries of 
marriage.33 Between 1996 and 1997, twenty-four states passed legislation 
effectively banning recognition of same-sex marriages, even when those 
marriages may have been valid elsewhere.34 In 1996, opposition groups 
successfully stalled states from recognizing same-sex marriage with a 
federal response in the form of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).35 This 
Act described marriage under federal law as singularly between a man and 
woman.36 DOMA further asserted that states are not required to recognize 
out-of-state same-sex marriages.37 It was not until 2013 that the Supreme 
Court declared DOMA to be unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor.38 
The Court reviewed DOMA’s impact of denying a lesbian couple who were 
married in Canada the same protections that different-sex married couples 
received and determined that the Act violated the Constitution.39 The Court 
reasoned that “DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States 
Code.”40 Windsor highlighted the tension between the federal government’s 
interest in protecting Due Process and Equal Protection of individuals and 
states’ interest in making sovereign decisions over marriages within their 
borders.41 
Finally, in 2015, the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. 
Hodges42 held that states must issue marriage licenses and recognize lawful 
out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples.43 While a major step towards 
equality for same-sex couples, Obergefell has also garnered some concern 
amongst advocates and scholars alike.44 By declaring marriage such a central 
and fundamental institution within society, the Court arguably lowered the 
status of nonmarital relationships.45 This is an important point that will be 
relevant for the discussion of parentage. If marriage is considered central to 
society by the Court and its status therefore lowers the importance of 
                                                                                                                     
Similarly, Hawaii converted the single route of heterosexual marriage to just one of a few forms of 
marriage. Id. at 216–17 (quoting Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI., 1998 WL 
88743, at *4–5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).  
33 Id. at 217. 
34 See id. (“By the spring of 2000, a total of thirty-five of the fifty states had legislated their 
unwillingness to recognize same-sex marriage.”). 
35 Id. at 218.  
36 COTT, supra note 9, at 218. 
37 Id. 
38 570 U.S. 744, 745 (2013). 
39 Id. at 744–45. 
40 Id. at 771.  
41 Id. at 770. 
42 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
43 Id. at 2607–08.  
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nonmarried couples’ relationships, the doctrine surrounding the protection 
of parental rights becomes key when considering child custody, whether in 
marriages or outside of them. Furthermore, recent demographic trends 
reflect that marriage rates are declining,46 which raises the question as to 
whether basing familial definitions along marital lines is the best approach. 
These trends reflect the continued shifting shape and form of families in the 
American household. What was once a strict nuclear definition of family in 
the courts is now changing to embrace the diversity that is far more 
representative of families’ realities.  
B. Changes in Family Formation 
While parentage may seem to be a straightforward biological concept, 
the application of parentage doctrine is far more complex. Particularly in 
recent years, courts have been confronted with a tension between two 
models of parentage. One model revolves around the more “traditional” 
dual-gendered, biological definition of parentage.47 The other model focuses 
on the formation of chosen (intentional) and functional families.48 Social 
constructions of gender, sexuality, race, and class have all impacted the laws 
surrounding family formation and recognition.49 Much of family law is 
rooted in heteronormative, classist, and racially hierarchical systems that do 
not aim to recognize the majority of families within the United States.50 
While family life is presumed to be private and confined to the home, the 
public sphere plays an active role dictating what it means to be a family and 
what rights families have.51 Generally, the state can, and often does, intrude 
to rigidly define family construction and child custody.52 When a state does 
become involved in questions of family construction, there inevitably is an 
incursion into questions of state values that are certainly influenced by 
societal norms.53 
Given the private nature of family and parentage, one must ask why 
states are so interested in defining families and parentage in such stark terms. 
Certainly, many of us can point to relationships in our lives that might not 
fit societal norms but still fulfill familial roles that society would find 
                                                                                                                     
46 D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 225 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016) (describing the “retreat from marriage” 
that reflects a decline in the rate of marriage amongst adults and the increase in nontraditional families). 
47 See Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based 
Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 92 (2004) (discussing the “traditional” nuclear family model).  
48 See id. at 116 (describing Nancy Polikoff’s functional approach to defining parentage).  
49 Id. at 143. 
50 Id. at 122.  
51 See COTT, supra note 9, at 3 (describing societal gender norms and the assumed role of women 
and men within the nuclear family). 
52 Id. at 4.  
53 See id. at 2–3 (describing certain models of marriage that are encouraged by the government).  
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important and valid, even if they are not legally recognized. Despite this 
reality, definitions of family and parentage in the United States are 
heteronormative.54 When the phrase “American family” is used, it has 
traditionally been associated with an economically middle-class, racially 
white, and structurally nuclear family.55 In this family, the father goes to 
work while the mother stays home with her children, one boy and one girl. 
Obviously, this mythical “American family” is far from the American 
truth.56 But it is important to recognize this stereotype in the context of 
family law because these assumptions and societal norms influence legal 
conceptualizations of family. Over recent years, however, courts have begun 
to recognize non-traditional families in a variety of contexts, and from that 
recognition has come a slow but steady broadening of what it means to be a 
parent in America. 
II. TRADITIONAL MODELS OF DEFINING PARENTAGE 
A legal parent is someone who, amongst other roles, is responsible for 
making decisions about a child’s health, education, and well-being.57 When 
the question of parentage ventures beyond the context of a man and woman 
who conceive without assistance, many legal issues arise as to what rights 
and obligations each parent has, especially if that parent does not have any 
biological or legal relationship with the child.58 Legal parentage is often an 
“all-or-nothing” analysis.59 For instance, an adoptive parent’s rights cannot 
begin until a biological parent’s rights end.60 This legal analysis is ill-fitted 
for the modern complexities of families.61 Often, under traditional 
definitions of parentage, same-sex parents are disadvantaged or left 
extremely vulnerable, particularly when they are not married.62  
Same-sex couples do not define parentage in such heteronormative 
terms, that is expecting a child to have one mother and one father. Therefore, 
a same-sex parent faces seemingly insurmountable barriers in seeking 
                                                                                                                     
54 See Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 122 (discussing the stereotypes associated with the nuclear 
family and how it does not reflect reality). 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 92 (“Even in its heyday, millions of American families did not have access to the wealth, 
racial privilege and geographic location necessary to establish the idealized nuclear family.”). 
57 NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 1 (2019), 
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf. 
58 See id. at 1–4 (describing various paths to parentage).  
59 Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the 
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 464 (1990). 
See also id. at 471–72 (describing the current legal approach to parental disputes and the ongoing efforts 
of courts to maintain a rigid two-parent family structure).   
60 Id. at 470 (“Similarly, a stepparent cannot adopt a child if the child has a living parent of the same 
sex as the stepparent and that parent does not consent to termination of his or her parental status.”). 
61 Id. at 473. 
62 Id. at 468–69. 
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custody of children who are not biologically related to them.63 Whether 
considering biological or social factors, children may have as many as five 
parents who could potentially bring a claim of parental rights.64 Despite this, 
courts have for the most part adhered to three main paths to parentage: 
biology, arrangement, or marital presumption of legitimacy. While biology 
may seem a simple route to parentage, modern technologies bring far more 
complexity to many biological relationships than in the past when biology 
was synonymous with “natural” conception. 
A. Biology 
A strictly biological perspective on parentage restricts family formation. 
For instance, the proposition that a child can have more than one father has 
been widely rejected.65 While many courts have worked to adhere to this 
strict standard, the reality is parents compose a wide variety of people within 
a child’s life and these relationships are far more complex than chromosomal 
lineage.66 A series of Supreme Court cases dealt with the question of parental 
rights, and the doctrine developed to specifically outline how parental rights 
are constitutionally protected, including which parents are and are not 
protected. Birth mothers (not in the surrogacy context) tend to benefit from 
a biological presumption, meaning that their parentage is presumed because 
of the act of giving birth.67 Biological fathers do not benefit from the same 
presumption, particularly when they are not married to the birth mother and 
therefore cannot benefit from the marital presumption.68 In fact, a biological 
father may have fewer rights than a non-biological father who is married to 
the birth mother.69 However, there are some protections in place, via 
procedure, that can facilitate parental rights claims by unwed biological 
fathers. For example, in 1972 the Court declared that unwed fathers are 
                                                                                                                     
63 See id. at 469 (describing the complexities of family formation and the fiction of familial 
homogeneity). 
64 See John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the 
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991) (“We now live in an era where a child may 
have as many as five different ‘parents.’ These include a sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate or 
gestational host, and two nonbiologically related individuals who intend to raise the child. Indeed, the 
process of procreation itself has become so fragmented by the variety and combinations of collaborative-
reproductive methods that there are a total of sixteen different reproductive combinations, in addition to 
traditional conception and childbirth.”). 
65 Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of 
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 602 (2000). See also Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469–70 (describing 
how few courts consider the possibility that a child may have more than one mother or father).  
66 Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469–70; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 
(1977) (recognizing the importance of grandparents within the household/as part of the family). 
67 Hill, supra note 64, at 354 n.8 (describing the “presumption of biology”). 
68 See id. at 376 (discussing the case of Michael H. and the limited ability of a biological father to 
seek parentage).  
69 See id. at 376–77 (discussing Stanley v. Illinois and the Court’s recognition of a husband’s 
parental rights over those of an alleged biological father).  
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entitled to a hearing to determine their fitness and are not presumptively 
unfit parents.70  
Biology has maintained a mythical status in many courts despite 
criticism from scholars. Further complicating matters, the birth certificate is 
often argued by prospective parents as a method of determining parentage.71 
But this method of identification is a legal fiction. Instead of determining or 
creating parentage, birth certificates are merely intended to accurately reflect 
the legal relationship between parent and child.72 The birth certificate does 
not create such a relationship, but instead documents it.73 Biological limits 
in defining the boundaries of parentage are expanded through certain 
agreements. 
B. Parentage by Arrangement 
When considering parentage beyond biology, certain theorists indicate 
that when considering an adult’s intention to be a parent, the existence of an 
arrangement to procreate, whether formal or informal, should be 
determinative of parental rights.74 Adoption and surrogacy arrangements are 
examples of paths to parentage by agreement. When an adoption takes place, 
prospective parents agree to take on parental rights and responsibilities and 
an individual who would otherwise have parental rights must consent, or in 
state-initiated custody cases have court consent, to have their parental rights 
terminated.75 Adoption agreements can take place before birth but do not 
become realized until the child is born. Similarly, surrogacy agreements 
allow prospective parents to arrange for another to conceive and deliver their 
child.76 Surrogacy agreements give rise to disputes both about who the 
intentional parents are and also who the biological and presumptive parents 
are.77 However, ending the analysis at whether there is the existence of a 
biological or contractual relationship makes invisible many parent-child 
relationships within the United States. It is further troubling that adoption 
                                                                                                                     
70 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658–59 (1972).  
71 See Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 
16, 2015) (reflecting a plaintiff’s claim of parentage, based in part on her name on the birth certificate). 
72 See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 789 n.17 (Conn. 2011) (“We have never stated, and do not 
hold today, that being named on a birth certificate as the parent to the child confers parental status on the 
named person. A person who is named on a birth certificate as a parent to the child is so named on the 
certificate as a function of the department’s responsibility to keep accurate records of vital records. The 
birth certificate must accurately reflect the legal relationship between parent and child, but it does not 
create that relationship.”). 
73 Id. at 793. 
74 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ 
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1820 (1993).  
75 Hill, supra note 64, at 354. 
76 Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of Legal Motherhood, 
33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2000).  
77 See id. at 133–34 (providing an example of a dispute arising from a surrogacy agreement).  
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and surrogacy agreements suggest “that power over children ought to be 
defined by adults’ bargained for exchanges.”78  
While parentage by agreement has certainly been an incredible and often 
miraculous path for couples to become parents, critics of parentage by 
agreement point out that certain agreements place individualistic interests 
above those of the family.79 There looms a tension between children’s rights 
versus parental rights. Scholars differ in opinion as to whose rights should 
triumph when there is a conflict.80 Intentional and functional approaches are 
needed to address the complexities of modern parent-child relationships. 
Courts have attempted to include more parent-child relationships by 
adapting older doctrines of legitimacy to potentially include same-sex 
couples within traditionally heteronormative models of parentage.  
C. The Marital Presumption of Legitimacy 
Despite courts’ reliance on biology in determining parentage, the law 
has always recognized some form of nonbiological parentage.81  
The core rule for assigning parenthood to men historically—
the marital presumption—“both facilitated parental 
recognition that departed from biological facts and cut off 
claims to parental recognition based on biological facts.” 
Conversely, nonmarital biological fathers generally had no 
parental rights historically. Thus, contrary to the assertions of 
some, the law has recognized and continues to recognize 
nonbiological parenthood.82 
While birth mothers are included within the “presumption of biology” 
because of the very act of giving birth, the same cannot be said for fathers.83 
Instead, a more complex doctrine emerged: the presumption of legitimacy 
(also known as the marital presumption).84 The presumption addresses when 
a child is born in the context of a legally recognized marriage.85 While the 
mother benefits from the biological presumption, the husband is presumed 
to be the child’s natural father regardless of biological ties.86 The 
presumption is deeply rooted in long-held concerns regarding the legitimacy 
                                                                                                                     
78 Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1820.  
79 Id. at 1821.  
80 See id. (discussing the differences in scholarly approaches to parental and children’s rights and 
whose rights should prevail in a conflict). 
81 Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA, 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 593–94 
(2018).  
82 Id. (quoting NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2272). 
83 Hill, supra note 64, at 370. 
84 Glennon, supra note 65, at 550; NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2266.  
85 Hill, supra note 64, at 372–73. 
86 NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2289.  
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of children.87 By presuming the husband to be the child’s father, the doctrine 
was thought to prevent children from suffering the status of illegitimacy.88 
While this presumption may appear to be biological in nature, it is far from 
that. The presumption reinforces fatherhood as a status that is a function of 
family relationships.89 The presumption would, for example, apply to a 
husband who was not present at the time of conception.90  
As it became recognized in the context of modern family formation, the 
presumption was less about biological lineage and more about presumptive 
parental recognition for the benefit of the child. This doctrine also began to 
slowly expand to include same-sex nonbiological spouses.91 This expansion 
of the presumption has generally applied to lesbian couples where one 
spouse has a child and the other is then presumed to be the child’s other 
parent.92 Despite the adaptation of this presumption and its seemingly 
flexible application, courts have generally declined to recognize that a child 
might in fact have more than two parents.93  
Instead, courts usually come to a rigid conclusion about which 
individual is the legal parent with parental rights to the child and which 
parties are considered third parties who are legally strangers in that child’s 
life.94 However, if neither marriage nor biology are the defining factors in 
determining a parent-child relationship, is the marital presumption of 
legitimacy still a relevant doctrine? When the marital presumption is applied 
to same-sex couples, it rests not on biology, but on their intentions and 
functions as parents.95 This seems to suggest that the presumption has the 
capacity to embody a functional definition of parentage, or at the very least, 
justify the incorporation of a functional definition.96 
                                                                                                                     
87 Hill, supra note 64, at 373. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 372. 
90 See id. at 372–73 (describing how, at common law, a husband did not need to be physically 
present at the time of conception in order for the presumption to apply; he could be at sea and still be 
presumed to be the father). 
91 See Nicole M. Riel, The Other Mother: Protecting Non-Biological Mothers in Same-Sex 
Marriages, 31 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 387, 394 (2018) (providing Connecticut as an example of a state 
that has expanded the presumption to same-sex couples); see also NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2291 
(describing the expansion of the marital presumption). 
92 See NeJaime, supra note 8, at 1190 (describing how a lesbian partner may be included within the 
presumption, not because of biology, but because of her intent to be a parent).  
93 See Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469 (arguing for more flexibility within the court system for the 
child’s best interests). 
94 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (holding that the presumption applied to 
the mother’s husband, rendering the biological father a third party with no parental rights to the child). 
95 NeJaime, supra note 8, at 1241–42.  
96 Id. at 1242.  
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D. Parental Rights and Best Interests of the Child 
It is worth noting that there is an apparent tension between parental 
rights doctrine and the best interests of the child analysis.97 The best interests 
analysis focuses on the needs of the child rather than the competing claims 
of the hopeful custodians.98 By focusing on the child rather than the 
relationship between the parents or a parent’s desire to have custody of the 
child, the conversation around parentage would certainly shift.99 Child rights 
advocates are calling for a refocusing of the conversation.100 Instead of 
working to secure children for adults who bring claims of custody, they 
assert the law should start providing adults to children who need them.101 
Courts have called into question whether it is truly in a child’s best interest, 
emotionally and developmentally, to retain biological parentage for “some 
abstract interest in truthfulness.”102 Instead of considering biology to be the 
test of parentage, the true test can be found in the social relationship between 
parent, or parents, and the child.103  
The theory that every child should have exactly one mother and one 
father denies the existence of nontraditional families and potentially 
punishes children in nontraditional families for the mere fact that they do not 
fit the societal mold. Furthermore, a strict approach to parent-child 
relationships outlines that the legally recognized mother and father should 
have all rights to the child, leaving any other interested party fully divested 
of any claim of parental rights, regardless of their relationship with a child.104 
As will be discussed further below, it is necessary to shift to intentional and 
functional definitions of parentage. When the law fails to recognize these 
nonbiological and nontraditional parent-child relationships, children are the 
ones who are harmed the most. The harms can range from emotional trauma 
to abrupt cut-offs to complete removal of financial and emotional support.105 
This is a pressingly important concern in the national context but is equally 
important on the state level and is indeed being addressed in some states.106 
                                                                                                                     
97 Hill, supra note 64, at 363. 
98 Id. 
99 See Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 133–34 (describing the Supreme Court’s dismissal of a child’s 
best interest position in Michael H. v. Gerald D. and how the analysis would have been different had the 
Court shifted its perspective to the child’s best interest). 
100 Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1754–55. 
101 Id. at 1812.  
102 Glennon, supra note 65, at 589–90 (quoting Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 123 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1994)). 
103 Id. at 589. 
104 Polikoff, supra note 59, at 469.  
105 Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal 
Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902–03 (1984).  
106 Some states have begun to venture beyond biology to reflect the complexity of children’s lives. 
For example, Louisiana now recognizes dual paternity, allowing the child to retain multiple fathers if it 
is in the child’s best interest. Glennon, supra note 65, at 602–03. 
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E. Re-examining Parental Constructs 
“Best interests of the child” emerged as a means to mitigate the older 
view of children as property. Advocates are calling for a realignment of 
family law and a shift of focus onto children.107 Such a shift would change 
the role of parents from one of ownership to stewardship.108 This approach 
to parentage tends to value the needs of the next generation most highly and 
encourages adult partnership and collective responsibility for the well-being 
of children.109 Where to place the focus is still hotly contested amongst 
scholars; some call for a refocusing on the best interests of the child,110 while 
others find this approach to be inadequate. For example, Katharine Bartlett, 
a professor at Duke University specializing in Gender, Sexuality, and 
Feminist Studies,111 criticizes the best interests analysis as still being too 
individualistic in nature.112 Instead of placing children’s interests over 
parents’ rights as the best interests test does, she advocates for a focus on the 
parent-child relationship.113 Given the flaws in purely functional, 
intentional, or best interests approaches, this Note advocates for a similar 
approach of focusing on the existence of a parent-child relationship 
regardless of other factors such as inter-parent relationships or the quantity 
of already existing parent-child relationships. If a child happens to have 
three nurturing, caring, and beneficial parent-child relationships, it hardly 
seems practical or even ethical to cut one relationship off simply because of 
the societal notion that only two parent-child relationships may exist at once. 
This is hardly an easy undertaking. Parental rights are rather unique from 
other rights given the delicate balance between state and individual interests 
as well as the reality that in order to give all legal parental rights to one 
individual, usually the other’s must first be extinguished.114 This is not the 
case in every area of the law but remains so in the area of child custody and 
parentage. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), for example, does 
not restrict the number of parent-child relationships that may exist.115 
Instead, the “specific facts of each situation will determine whether an 
                                                                                                                     
107 Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1754–55. 
108 Id. at 1755.  
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
111 Katharine T. Bartlett, DUKE U., https://scholars.duke.edu/person/Bartlett (last visited July 27, 
2019).  
112 Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1821. 
113 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 303–04 (1988).  
114 Bartlett, supra note 105, at 883–84. 
115 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FS 28B, FACT SHEET #28B: FMLA LEAVE FOR 
BIRTH, PLACEMENT, BONDING, OR TO CARE FOR A CHILD WITH A SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION ON THE 
BASIS OF AN “IN LOCO PARENTIS” RELATIONSHIP 2 (2015), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28B.pdf (“The FMLA does not restrict the number of 
parents a child may have.”). 
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employee stands in loco parentis to a child.”116 The FMLA illustrates this 
refocusing; instead of asking what are the parents’ intentions or what is the 
parents’ relationship like, it looks to the relationship between the parent and 
the child to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists.117 
It is not enough to assume “that an adult’s relationship (sexual or 
otherwise) with a parent creates a caregiving relationship between that 
person and the child . . . . It again focuses too strongly on parental ‘rights’ 
and presumptive statuses.”118 While this Note does not call for such a broad 
approach that would allow any caretaker to claim full parental rights, 
reconsidering societal constructs of parentage would allow for potential 
parents to not be automatically excluded. It would open the door for more 
beneficial and mutual parent-child relationships to have legal recognition.119 
While reconfiguring societal constructs and norms may be far more daunting 
than adopting the intentional and functional provisions of the UPA (2017), 
these constructs regarding child and parent interests are operating in the 
background. The sooner the legislature confronts the broader questions of 
what is a family and how is it defined, the sooner parent-child relationships 
will be protected. 
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DEFINING PARENTAGE IN CONNECTICUT 
A. Same Sex Couples’ Marital Rights in Connecticut 
Before the deciding of Obergefell,120 the Connecticut legislature, 
beginning in 2004, addressed same-sex marriage equality by implementing 
a statutory scheme that implemented civil unions as a means of gaining legal 
status as a couple.121 Because same-sex couples only had access to civil 
unions whereas their heterosexual counterparts had access to the full 
institution of marriage, the parties in Kerrigan filed for summary judgment 
on constitutional grounds.122 In Kerrigan, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
116 Id. (“The fact that a child has a biological parent in the home, or has both a mother and a father, 
does not prevent an employee from standing in loco parentis to that child.”). 
117 Id. at 1–2 (defining in loco parentis and identifying some factors used by courts to determine 
whether such a relationship exists between the individual and the child). 
118 Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 129–30. 
119 See id. at 143 (“The rewriting of the definition of ‘family,’ and a move away from the exclusive 
family paradigm has radical potential. It challenges the systems of domination based on class, race and 
sexuality that serve as the basis for too much of our family law and public policy. Instead, structuring the 
role of the law and state as one of support rather than family-model enforcement begins to bring care into 
our political sphere. Re-casting the legal language of family in a flexible, care-based way means that all 
families can be recognized, protected, and supported in the actual caregiving work that they are doing—
a public policy that is good for parents, children, the state, and society as a whole.”). 
120 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
121 Heather J. Lange, Life with Kerrigan: Issues in Advising Same-Sex Couples in Connecticut, 19 
CONN. LAW. 28, 29 (2009). 
122 Id.   
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concluded that “the state has failed to provide sufficient justification for 
excluding same sex couples from the institution of marriage.”123 Kerrigan 
solidified many rights for same-sex couples in Connecticut, including 
benefits in taxation, immigration, and probate matters.124 After the 
recognition of same-sex marriage, discussions surrounding same-sex 
parentage began to truly take form.125 The Kerrigan decision, while an 
exciting and long overdue step forward, did not end all problems for same-
sex couples seeking parentage in Connecticut.  
B. Parentage and Defining the Parent-Child Relationship 
As discussed above, the societal construction of the American family 
generally limits the number of parents a child may have to two. Furthermore, 
in the legal context, if a child already has two legally recognized parents, 
one parent’s rights would have to end in order for another parent’s rights to 
begin.126 It seems as though society, and indeed our legislature, remains 
entrenched in a biological and rigid definition of parentage. But both 
common knowledge and common law tell us that there is far more to a 
parent-child relationship than simply genetic ties. 
In Connecticut, child custody is often considered by the courts in two 
contexts: custody disputes between private individuals and proceedings in 
which the State, via the Department of Children and Families (DCF), 
becomes involved.127 Child custody matters are litigated under the 
Connecticut General Statutes that provide for both termination of parental 
rights as well as subsequent child adoption proceedings.128 It is helpful to 
briefly examine parental rights termination grounds when considering the 
parent-child relationship because courts are asked to consider the intent of 
the legislature as well as what it means to have an ongoing parent-child 
relationship.129 Courts, when confronted with the question of parentage, 
                                                                                                                     
123 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); see also Lange, supra 
note 121, at 29 (quoting the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan). 
124 Lange, supra note 121, at 29–31. 
125 When Kerrigan was decided, significant barriers still existed for same-sex couples seeking 
parentage. For example, even after Kerrigan, the Department of Children and Families could consider 
sexual orientation when determining adoption, and many Connecticut statutes still employed gendered 
language such as “husband” and “wife.” Id. at 31.  
126 Bartlett, supra note 105, at 879. 
127 See CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH LAW LIBRARIES, CHILD CUSTODY ACTIONS IN CONNECTICUT: A 
GUIDE TO RESOURCES IN THE LAW LIBRARY 6 (2018), 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/lawlib/Notebooks/Pathfinders/ChildCustody/childcustody.pdf (discussing the 
“few legal avenues” where a person can obtain legal custody of a minor in Connecticut).  
128 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-717 (Westlaw through enactments of public acts enrolled and approved 
by Governor on or before July 3, 2019 and effective on or before July 1, 2019). 
129 See In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 603 (Conn. 1991) (discussing the legislature’s intentional 
decision to maintain the language “no ongoing parent-child relationship” as opposed to characterizing 
that relationship as meaningful or otherwise).  
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often look to termination statutes for guidance.130 When considering the 
parent-child relationship in the context of parental rights termination 
proceedings, Connecticut courts have recognized that a biological tie, or 
even parental love, is not necessarily enough to establish a parent-child 
relationship.131 
Termination of parental rights is defined as “complete severance by 
court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, 
between the child and [their] parent.”132 Connecticut courts have clearly 
indicated that deference should be accorded to the parental relationship 
given its significance and that termination of parental rights is “a most 
serious and sensitive judicial action.”133 Because of this, there is ample 
language from both the legislature and the courts regarding what constitutes 
an ongoing parent-child relationship. Central to this ground for termination 
is the question of whether the child has any present memories or feelings for 
the parent.134 This is relevant in the context of same-sex couples and their 
parental rights because it suggests that the State has already recognized that 
there are factors beyond biology or contract that impact whether it is in the 
child’s best interest for a legally recognized parent to maintain their parental 
rights. 
C. Relevant Case Law for Same-Sex Couples Seeking Parentage in 
Connecticut 
Connecticut, like other states, tends to privilege biological relationships 
when considering parental rights, and thus opposite-sex married couples 
tend to have an advantage that same-sex couples are deprived.135 
Connecticut historically has recognized three paths to parentage: 
conception, adoption, or consent pursuant to the artificial insemination 
statutes.136 While these are the most well recognized paths to parentage, they 
hardly reflect the full breadth of experience of Connecticut parentage. For 
instance, the marital presumption is well-founded in Connecticut common 
law given the state’s strong public policy favoring the legitimacy of 
children.137 While the presumption has been applied in the context of 
same-sex parental disputes in Connecticut, it is not necessarily clear how to 
                                                                                                                     
130 See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 788–90, nn.16–18 (Conn. 2011) (referencing Connecticut 
statutes that deal with routes to parenthood, parent-child relationships, and termination of parental rights). 
131 In re Ashley S., 769 A.2d 718, 725 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).  
132 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-707(8) (Westlaw through enactments of public acts enrolled and 
approved by Governor on or before July 3, 2019 and effective on or before July 1, 2019). 
133 In re Luis C., 554 A.2d 722, 726 (Conn. 1989). 
134 In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 768 (Conn. 1992). 
135 Riel, supra note 91, at 387–88. 
136 Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 789 (Conn. 2011).  
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apply the presumption in Connecticut and what its interaction is with 
equitable parentage. Furthermore, Connecticut has a quasi-functional 
definition of parentage in its approach to third-party visitation.  
A seminal case in this area is a 1998 Connecticut Supreme Court 
decision Doe v. Doe,138 concerning custody of a child born via surrogacy. 
Upon the dissolution of their marriage, the plaintiff wife sought custody of 
the child she had raised with her then husband, the defendant.139 While the 
plaintiff and defendant had raised the child together, no adoption 
proceedings took place that established the plaintiff, a nonbiological parent, 
as an adoptive mother.140 In reviewing her claim, the court declined to apply 
the equitable parent doctrine to include the plaintiff as a parent of the 
child.141 The court went on to outline the various circumstances under which 
it would recognize individuals as legal parents of a child; however, intended 
parentage was not included in the court’s list.142 The court explained its role 
as one that provides appropriate remedies rather than defining parentage.143 
The Doe court construed both common and statutory law to include a narrow 
set of circumstances under which nonbiologically-related individuals could 
assume a parental role in a child’s life, and these circumstances necessarily 
                                                                                                                     
138 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).  
139 The child at issue in the case was conceived via surrogacy and was biologically related only to 
the defendant husband. Prior to their marriage, the defendant solicited a surrogate on Craigslist who 
subsequently became pregnant. After the child’s birth, the surrogate mother and her husband did not 
bring any claim of parentage. No adoption proceedings took place during the marriage despite the 
plaintiff and defendant raising the child together for fourteen years. The trial court found that the child 
was not an “issue of the marriage” because she was conceived a few months prior to the defendant and 
plaintiff’s wedding. Furthermore, the lower court noted that the presumption of legitimacy pointed to the 
surrogate’s husband being the legal father of the child as the child was born during their wedlock rather 
than during the parties’ marriage. The trial court therefore found that it did not have jurisdiction to enter 
custody orders in regard to the child because the child was neither an issue of the marriage nor adopted 
by the parties, nor a natural child of one of the parties who had been adopted by the other. Id. at 1297–
1303. 
140 Id. at 1300.  
141 See id. at 1317 (“[I]mplicit in our analysis is that we reject the ‘equitable parent’ doctrine.”). 
142  
Although the statutes have never explicitly defined the contours of the concept of a 
“child of the marriage,” our cases have interpreted that concept in a consistent manner, 
both before and after the historic 1973 revision. A review of that case law . . . leads 
us to conclude that the meaning of that concept . . . is limited to a child conceived by 
both parties, a child adopted by both parties, a child born to the wife and adopted by 
the husband, a child conceived by the husband and adopted by the wife, and a child 
born to the wife and conceived through artificial insemination by a donor pursuant to 
§§ 45a-771 through 45a-779.  
Id. at 1314.  
143 Id. at 1318.  
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included proceedings such as adoption or a rebuttal of the presumption of 
legitimacy.144  
Doe v. Doe illustrates multiple approaches to parentage that are 
available in considering statutory reform in Connecticut. The court first 
considered the biological relationships at play. In Doe, the court referenced 
the genetic ties that existed between the surrogate mother and the child.145 
The court contemplated the presumption of legitimacy, as the lower court 
had found that it applied to the surrogate’s husband due to the child being 
born within that marriage, as opposed to the marriage between the plaintiff 
and defendant.146 The court found that the presumption was sufficiently 
rebutted due to the clear intentions of the defendant and plaintiff in raising 
the child for fourteen years.147 Furthermore, the presumption would have 
proved problematic in this case as it would be the surrogate’s husband who 
could have been presumed to be a parent since the child was technically an 
issue of the surrogate’s marriage, despite her giving the child up at birth.148 
Ultimately, the court ruled that, given her active role in the child’s life, the 
lower court should allow the plaintiff the opportunity to seek custody. The 
court further alluded that there “was ample evidence in this record that, if 
credited, would have been sufficient to justify an award of joint custody to 
both parties.”149  
More than a decade after Doe, in 2011, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
was confronted with the question of whether an intended parent, not 
biologically related to the child nor an adoptive parent, could “become a 
legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement.”150 In 
Raftopol v. Ramey, the court noted that Doe was decided prior to the passage 
of new artificial insemination statutes.151 The court held that Connecticut 
statutes did allow “an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational 
agreement to become a parent without first adopting the children, without 
respect to that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children.”152 The 
court provided the following hypothetical to illustrate their decision. 
Suppose an infertile couple who desire to have children but 
cannot supply the womb, the eggs, or the sperm . . . . These 
intended parents would need to rely on third party egg and 
sperm donors to produce embryos that are implanted in a 
                                                                                                                     
144 See id. at 1323–24 (holding that the presumption was sufficiently rebutted in this case as the 
plaintiff and defendant participated in nearly every aspect of the child’s life since she was born).  
145 Id. at 1300–01. 
146 Id. at 1303. 
147 Id. at 1323–24.  
148 Id. at 1300. 
149 Id. at 1324. 
150 Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 784–85 (Conn. 2011).  
151 Id. at 796.  
152 Id. at 797.  
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gestational carrier pursuant to a gestational agreement. If § 
7-48a confers parental status only on biological intended 
parents, the intended parents are not the parents of any 
resulting child, nor are the gestational carrier, any spouse she 
may have, the gamete donors, or any spouses each may have. 
Every possible parent to the child would be eliminated as a 
matter of law, yielding the result of a child who is born 
parentless, not due to the death of the parents, but simply due 
to elimination by operation of law.153 
The Raftopol court therefore found that, even without formally adopting 
a child, an intended parent who is party to a valid gestational agreement 
gains recognition as a parent to that child and may have their name placed 
on the birth certificate, regardless of any biological connection.154 Finally, it 
is worth noting that Raftopol did not address intentional parentage in the 
absence of such an agreement.  
More recently, in 2015, a New Britain superior court considered the case 
of a lesbian couple seeking divorce, Barse v. Pasternak.155 The parties’ civil 
union of 2005 was converted into a legally recognized marriage in 2010.156 
In 2008, the defendant became pregnant via artificial insemination. The 
plaintiff never adopted the child and the parties never entered into a 
gestational agreement.157 This removes the case from the previously 
mentioned Raftopol decision because there was no agreement in place that 
the court could have used to infer intent. In Barse, the defendant, seeking 
sole custody, argued the marital presumption of legitimacy did not apply to 
children born to married same-sex couples.158 The court noted that there was 
no controlling authority on this matter in the state.159 The Barse court 
therefore looked to Kerrigan and found guidance in the court’s holding that 
same-sex and different-sex couples should be afforded the same rights and 
benefits of marriage.160  
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff was not the legal parent as she 
did not comply with one of the three recognized paths to parentage: 
conception, adoption, or gestational agreement.161 In regard to the legal 
significance of parties’ failure to comply with artificial insemination 
statutes, the Barse court found that neither the language nor the legislative 
history of the statutes implied they were intended to be the exclusive means 
                                                                                                                     
153 Id. at 804.  
154 Id. 
155 No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2015). 
156 Id. at *2.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at *8. 
159 Id.   
160 Id. at *9. 
161 Id. at *3.  
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to establish parentage.162 The plaintiff further argued that the artificial 
insemination statutes didn’t replace the common law marital presumption of 
legitimacy. The plaintiff pointed to factors such as being named on the birth 
certificate, the child being an “issue” of the marriage, and being an intended 
parent. Therefore, she argued, the court should adopt the equitable parent 
doctrine because to do otherwise would be discriminatory.163 
The court in Barse was able to rely on equitable principles in order to 
prevent the marital presumption of legitimacy from being rebutted in regard 
to a nonbiologically-related same-sex spouse claiming parental rights.164 
Equitable estoppel “differs from the equitable parent doctrine in that it does 
not create a legal status, but rather prohibits the other party from opposing 
that status.”165 The distinction between equitable estoppel and equitable 
parentage is important. Equitable parentage focuses on the relationship 
between the nonbiological parent and the child as opposed to equitable 
estoppel, which deals mostly with the relationship between the parents as 
well as the nonbiological parent’s reliance on the other parent’s 
representations.166 
The court noted that the plaintiff could use equitable principles (not 
equitable parentage) to estop rebuttal of the presumption, but it was up to 
the plaintiff to meet her burden of proof.167 In discussing equitable parentage 
versus equitable estoppel, the court referenced a Michigan case, Atkinson v. 
Atkinson.168 There, the Michigan Court of Appeals outlined three 
considerations under the doctrine of equitable parentage: (1) the parent-child 
relationship is mutually acknowledged; (2) the individual desires the right 
to be a parent; and (3) the individual is willing to take on the responsibility 
of child support.169 The Atkinson court subsequently found that the 
nonbiological parent in that case was legally a parent.170 Connecticut has yet 
to apply such a clearly functional definition of parentage. 
                                                                                                                     
162 Id. at *6–7. The court also discussed Laura WW. v. Peter WW., 51 A.D.3d 211, 217–18 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2008), in which the husband was considered to be the child’s father when the child was 
conceived via artificial insemination. The court found the husband to be the child’s father even though 
there was no written record of the husband’s intent to have a child. For further discussion of WW. v. WW., 
see Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *6.  
163 Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *3.  
164 Riel, supra note 91, at 394.  
165 Id. at 402 (citing Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1334 n.16 (Conn. 1998) (Katz, J., dissenting)).  
166 See Doe, 710 A.2d at 1334 n.16 (Katz, J., dissenting) (“I disagree with the defendant’s argument 
that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable parentage are essentially the same. Although both 
address the issues of representation and reliance, equitable parentage focuses primarily upon the 
relationship between the nonbiological parent and the child whose custody is at issue, while equitable 
estoppel focuses exclusively on the nonparent’s reliance on the representations of the parent.”). 
167 Barse, 2015 WL 600973, at *14 (noting that this is a question of fact).  
168 160 Mich. App. 601 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
169 Id. at 608–09.  
170 Id. at 610–11. 
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Connecticut courts have considered a quasi-functional definition of 
parentage when employing the third-party doctrine. In Roth v. Weston,171 the 
Connecticut Supreme Court engaged with this doctrine to work out the 
parameters of third-party visitation and how to balance the best interests of 
the child with the fundamental rights of a parent.172 The claim was brought 
by the child’s maternal grandmother and maternal aunt seeking third-party 
visitation rights.173 After the passing of the child’s mother, the defendant 
father ceased contact with the plaintiffs, thus causing them to bring an action 
for court-ordered visitation in the best interests of the child.174  
Roth first engaged in a discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Troxel v. Granville.175 In Troxel, the Court reviewed a Washington Supreme 
Court decision that held a visitation statute to be facially unconstitutional.176 
The plurality in Troxel, while hesitant to make a finding that all such statutes 
were unconstitutional on their face, held that this particular statute was 
unconstitutional in its application.177 It would have allowed two 
grandparents to assert visitation rights over the parent’s right to decide who 
interacts with their child.178 The Court held that the statute at issue was 
overly broad and invaded the fundamental rights of parents to choose how 
to raise their children.179 Further, the Court noted that the lower court “failed 
to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material 
weight.”180 
In defining the parameters of when the State may impose visitation upon 
a parent, the Roth court stated that the best interests of a child are secondary 
to the fundamental privacy interests of parents.181 The court clarified that in 
the absence of abuse or neglect, the State’s interest in the child’s best interest 
is outweighed by the constitutional protections afforded to legally 
recognized parents.182 This assertion, at first glance, appears to be a major 
obstacle for intentional and functional parents alike. Despite it being in the 
best interest of the child to have that parent recognized, parental rights of 
legally recognized parents are given more weight.183 However, the Roth 
                                                                                                                     
171 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002). 
172 See id. at 436 (discussing the defendant’s claim that the statute at issue violates his parental 
rights to choose how to raise his child).  
173 Id. at 433–34. 
174 Id. at 434. 
175 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
176 See id. at 57 (“Washington Rev. Code §26.10.160(3) permits ‘[a]ny person’ to petition for 
visitation rights ‘at any time’ and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation 
may serve a child’s best interest.” (alteration in original)). 
177 Id. at 57–58. 
178 Id. at 60–61.  
179 Id. at 67.  
180 Id. at 72.  
181 Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 443–44 (Conn. 2002). 
182 Id. at 444. 
183 Id. 
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court went on to make an important connection. The court recognized that 
in certain circumstances, such emotional ties are formed between a child and 
legally unrecognized parent that denial of visitation may cause serious harm 
rising to the level of abuse or neglect. 
We can envision circumstances in which a nonparent and a child have 
developed such substantial emotional ties that the denial of visitation could 
cause serious and immediate harm to that child. For instance, when a person 
has acted in a parental-type capacity for an extended period of time, 
becoming an integral part of the child’s regular routine, that child could 
suffer serious harm should contact with that person be denied or so limited 
as to seriously disrupt that relationship. Thus, proof of a close and substantial 
relationship and proof of real and significant harm should visitation be 
denied are, in effect, two sides of the same coin. Without having established 
substantial, emotional ties to the child, a petitioning party could never prove 
that serious harm would result to the child should visitation be denied. This 
is as opposed to the situation in which visitation with a third party would be 
in the best interests of the child or would be very beneficial. The level of 
harm that would result from denial of visitation in such a situation is not of 
the magnitude that constitutionally could justify overruling a fit parent’s 
visitation decision. Indeed, the only level of emotional harm that could 
justify court intervention is one that is akin to the level of harm that would 
allow the State to assume custody under General Statutes sections 46b-120 
and 46b-129—namely, that the child is “neglected, uncared-for or 
dependent” as those terms have been defined.184 
While not explicitly applied in the context of same-sex parentage, the 
Roth court exemplifies the value that an intentional or functional parent can 
have in a child’s life. Without the proper protections, however, intentional 
and functional parents face a high bar to even gain visitation with their child, 
let alone custody or any semblance of full parental rights.185 
                                                                                                                     
184 Id. at 445.  
185 While Roth calls for a demonstration of harm before denying a third-party visitation, courts in 
other states have made the distinction between third parties and de facto parents who are in parity with a 
legally recognized parent. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 163–64 (Wash. 2005), concerned the 
custody of a child who was conceived during the relationship of two women: Carvin and Britain. Id. at 
164. During their relationship, the couple decided to have a child. With the assistance of a family friend, 
Britain conceived the child via artificial insemination. The couple then held themselves out to be the 
parents of the child for seven years. Upon the dissolution of their relationship, Britain sought to end all 
contact between Carvin and the child. Id. at 163–64. The Washington Supreme Court allowed for 
recognition of a de facto parent, distinct from third-party status, without requiring a demonstration of 
harm should the relationship cease. Id. at 176. Instead, the court considered whether:  
(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship; 
(2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the petitioner 
assumed obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation; 
and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have 
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.  
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In examining the aforementioned cases, Connecticut courts have come 
up with a series of approaches to assist same-sex parents in being legally 
recognized as parents. Whether this is by stretching the marital presumption 
of legitimacy or applying equitable principles, the courts have worked to 
provide equal footing to same-sex couples. Thus, even though Connecticut 
courts have given considerable attention in select circumstances in which 
married same-sex couples may seek parental rights, the question remains: 
What about everyone else? Marriage is on a steady decline in the United 
States.186 As discussed above, the definition of family is changing. However, 
same-sex parents who have children in unmarried relationships continue to 
lack the same protections as unwed fathers in different-sex relationships.  
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized the gaps in current 
legislation noting that the legislature itself recognized that it has 
“postponed” working on these issues.187 It is time for the legislature to 
abandon this “piecemeal”188 approach and face issues of parentage head on. 
This Note advocates for a change, albeit significant, in Connecticut 
legislation that would incorporate provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act 
(2017) and shift the conversation from a focus on parents and individualistic 
rights to a specific focus on children and their relationship with their parents, 
whether biological, contractual, presumed, intended, or functional.  
IV. ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2017) IN CONNECTICUT 
Given the flaws with biologically based parental recognition and the 
potential to focus more on parent-child relationships, the Uniform Parentage 
Act (2017) (UPA (2017)) provides a model of what functional and 
intentional definitions of parentage could look like in Connecticut.189 While 
not binding, the UPA (2017) offers a means for states to reform parentage 
statutes in a way that will hopefully promote uniformity across the 
country.190 The UPA (2017) provides guidance as to who should be 
considered a parent when there are multiple claimants191 and expands who 
can be recognized as a parent with the purpose to protect actual parent-child 
relationships.192 The newest version of the UPA came out in 2017 and is 
significantly different from previous versions in a few important ways. 
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 176. Therefore, on remand, if Carvin could establish that she was a de facto parent, both mothers 
would have fundamental liberty interests at stake. 
186 COTT, supra note 9, at 203. 
187 Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 801 (Conn. 2011).  
188 Id. 
189 Joslin, supra note 81, at 592. 
190 Id. at 610.  
191 Id. at 604.  
192 Id. at 601–02. 
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A. Restructuring of the Uniform Parentage Act 
The UPA (2017) removed the gendered terminology, such as father, 
mother, maternity, and paternity, that can be found in previous versions, 
replacing those words with “parent” or “parentage.”193 This allows for 
further inclusion of diverse families and also ease of administration 
throughout the provisions of the Act.194 For example, the UPA (2017) 
contains a revised holding out provision that is now more inclusive.195 The 
holding out provision allows an individual to be recognized as a parent 
“based on the individual’s conduct of living with the child and treating the 
child as her own.”196 While the holding out provision has been included in 
the UPA since its initial promulgation in 1973, this change in gendered terms 
is highly significant as it now applies beyond just prospective fathers.197 The 
UPA (2017) now contains gender neutral provisions concerning voluntary 
acknowledgement of parentage (rather than paternity) and a de facto 
parentage.198 
Beyond these provisions, the UPA (2017) also accounts for other 
methods of parental recognition such as the marital presumption, assisted 
reproduction, and surrogacy.199 Given the current gaps in Connecticut law, 
the legislature should consider adopting a version of the UPA (2017). The 
advantages of recent changes are outlined by advocates in the field and 
cannot be overstated.200 By adopting the changes inherent in the UPA 
(2017), Connecticut would be protecting parent-child relationships and 
correct the State’s present failure in recognizing loving and supportive 
relationships. The UPA (2017) would provide certainty to many Connecticut 
families who are seeking to have children.201 Furthermore, it would make 
the difficulties of family breakdown less traumatic for children because, 
regardless of parent gender or sexual orientation, the process of parental 
recognition would be laid clear. 
B. Previous Attempts: The Connecticut Parentage Act 
Connecticut case law reflects a general reluctance amongst the courts to 
apply an equitable parent doctrine to claims of parentage by same-sex 
couples. Therefore, the legislature is best situated to address the growing 
                                                                                                                     
193 Douglas NeJaime, What Is the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017 and Why Does Connecticut Need 
It? 1 (Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with author).  
194 Id.  
195 Joslin, supra note 81, at 600–01. 
196 Id. at 600.  
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198 Id. at 601. 
199 Id. at 602–03. 
200 See id. at 611–12 (discussing the implications of adopting the UPA (2017)).  
201 Id. at 603 n.83.  
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need for revised definitions of parentage. In early January 2019, during the 
drafting of this Note, a bill rose in the Judiciary Committee that had the 
potential to address many of the barriers discussed. The Connecticut 
Parentage Act (CPA), as proposed, would have clarified who could be a 
parent and how to establish parentage.202 This kind of legislation would be a 
significant step in the direction of removing same-sex parents from their 
current, often vulnerable, legal status.203 As of February 2019, the proposed 
bill was pulled from committee and is being redrafted possibly for the 
following legislative session in early 2020.204 
As definitions of parentage change, new definitions must be realistically 
operationalized, otherwise parentage will cease to be a helpful legal doctrine 
and will be reduced to nothing more than theory.205 While not denying the 
importance of biological lineage, there is a great need to expand the 
definition of parent to include social factors that contribute to parent-child 
relationships.206 This urgent need to change definitions of family stems from 
the fact that there are so many other kinds of families that go beyond 
“traditional” concepts of the nuclear family. Whether it be parents who 
employ modern technology to conceive and have children, or parents who 
have no biological relationship to their children at all, these parent-child 
relationships must be examined within the context of the relationship to the 
child.   
It is true that Connecticut has begun to expand the presumption of 
legitimacy to stretch and include same-sex couples seeking parentage; 
however, its application is unsatisfactory and limited. Marriage rates 
                                                                                                                     
202 See NeJaime, supra note 193, at 1 (on file with author).  
203 See generally id. (discussing the necessary changes that would occur should Connecticut adopt 
the UPA (2017)).   
204 E-mail from Douglas NeJaime, Anne Urowsky Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., to Hannah 
Kalichman, Student, Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:27 EST) (on file with author). 
205 See Hill, supra note 64, at 361 (describing that changing the definition of parenthood too much 
may diminish its social significance). 
206  
Consider just a few examples. In Connecticut, a married different-sex couple had a 
child through surrogacy and raised the child together for fourteen years. When they 
divorced, the court deemed the mother, who had neither a gestational nor genetic 
connection to the child, a legal stranger to her child. In Florida, an unmarried same-sex 
couple used the same donor sperm to have four children, with each woman giving 
birth to two children. They raised the children together until their relationship ended 
several years later, at which point the court left each woman with parental rights only 
to her two biological children. In New Jersey, a male same-sex couple used a donor 
egg to have a child through a gestational surrogate. The court recognized the 
gestational surrogate, rather than the biological father’s husband (and the child’s 
primary caretaker), as the second parent.  
NeJaime, supra note 6, at 2265 (citing Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998); Russell v. Pasik, 178 
So. 3d 55, 59–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, 2009 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3250 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009)).  
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continue to decline nationally while nonmarital cohabitation becomes 
progressively less taboo.207 As children are born out of wedlock without the 
once detrimental consequences of “illegitimacy,” the logic of having 
marriage dictate much of parental rights seems diminished. Nationally a 
trend has begun to develop that favors a functional, social definition of 
parentage. This definition includes the individuals who function as a parent 
in a child’s life. The question now is not whether to recognize parentage in 
the absence of a biological relationship, but how. 
Given Connecticut’s active work towards promoting marriage equality, 
it is time for the state to follow through and fully protect parent-child 
relationships that are outside the traditional, heteronormative narrative. 
While the UPA (2017) has not yet been adopted in a great number of 
states,208 the next sections describe two legislative proposals that are guided 
by the UPA (2017): one advocates for the adoption of an intentional 
parentage framework that would allow parents to establish their status even 
before the child is born, and the other advocates for a functional, de facto 
definition of parentage to better address situations where the question of 
parentage is litigated later in the parent-child relationship.  
C. Intentional Parentage 
In the context of child custody, courts already employ an intent-based 
analysis in certain situations outside of the context of the UPA (2017). For 
example, when there are conflicting claims amongst biological relatives, 
many courts will then consider intentionality as a dispositive factor in 
determining parental rights.209 Additionally, adoption is a quintessential 
example in which a person’s intent to be a parent counts in their claim for 
parentage.210 Granted, adoption is reinforced by agreement, but it is an 
example of a “strong social tradition of recogniz[ing] the purely social and 
psychological dimensions of parenting.”211 When a child is conceived via 
artificial insemination and a surrogate is used, potentially three mothers may 
have claims of parentage.212 In California, for example, the state supreme 
court gave priority to a commissioning mother’s claim of legal parentage, 
                                                                                                                     
207 COTT, supra note 9, at 203. 
208 Thus far, only three states, Washington, California, and Vermont, have adopted versions of the 
UPA (2017). Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/ 
community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f (last visited July 27, 
2019).  
209 See Hill, supra note 64, at 386 (discussing the Baby M case and the considerations of intention 
in the surrogacy context). 
210 See Hurwitz, supra note 76, at 146 (discussing how intent to place a child up for adoption is 
“multidimensional and complicated,” despite court reliance on contracts as exclusive evidence of intent).  
211 Hill, supra note 64, at 354.  
212 See Hurwitz, supra note 76, at 135–40 (describing priorities of the courts to honor claims of 
motherhood by genetic mothers, intentional mothers, and gestational mothers).  
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finding intent to be the “tie breaker.”213 This lends support to the argument 
that a parent’s pre-birth intent to be a parent is a valid and important factor 
in considering parental rights.214  
Vermont is one of the first states to adopt a version of the UPA (2017):  
the Vermont Parentage Act.215 In Sinnott v. Peck, the Vermont Supreme 
Court was confronted with a scenario that the UPA (2017) was intended to 
address: a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship who had not 
legally adopted the child, was not married to the child’s legal parent, and 
sought legal recognition of their parent-child relationship.216 The couple in 
Sinnott had mutually decided to proceed with an adoption from 
Guatemala.217 Due to extenuating circumstances, the couple agreed that the 
defendant would formally seek the adoption given her past experience with 
the process.218 After the relationship ended, the couple continued to co-
parent the child for three years before the defendant stopped allowing the 
plaintiff to see the child.219  
The plaintiff brought an action in Vermont Superior Court seeking legal 
recognition as a parent under the Vermont Parentage Act.220 The Vermont 
Supreme Court focused on the legislative intent of adoption statutes and their 
general aim of promoting child welfare.221 In discussing relevant Vermont 
caselaw, the court noted that instead of basing parentage off of the parents’ 
relationship status alone, the courts look to a series of factors including the 
nature of the inter-parent relationship, a mutual intention to co-parent, 
participation in decision making, and the fact that no other person is claiming 
parental status.222 These factors echo the considerations outlined in the UPA 
(2017) and allowed the court to recognize the important parent-child 
                                                                                                                     
213 Id. at 135.  
214 Id. See also Woodhouse, supra note 74, at 1757 (describing the “gestational father” who supports 
and nurtures the mother during pregnancy, a role that modern definitions often omit when determining 
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relationship that existed in this case based off the individual’s intention to 
be that child’s parent.223 
Beyond defining intentional parentage, the UPA (2017) includes a 
voluntary acknowledgement of parentage provision that promotes the 
recognition of an individual’s intention to be a parent. This allows same-sex 
couples the opportunity to engage in family planning and hopefully assert 
their intentions to become parents prior to the birth or adoption of a child. 
Prior versions of the UPA included only the establishment of paternity 
through this administrative process.224 In contrast:  
UPA (2017) makes Article 3 gender neutral and refers to the 
establishment of parentage through the acknowledgement 
process for an alleged genetic father, an intended parent, and 
a presumed parent, allowing Article 3 to apply to both men and 
women. The gender-neutral language and addition of the term 
“intended parent” is consistent with one of the goals of this 
revision process, which is to ensure that UPA (2017) applies 
equally to same-sex couples.225 
The UPA (2017) sets forth a procedure through which individuals may 
voluntarily acknowledge their parentage so long as their acknowledgement 
is not in conflict with another individual’s established parental status.226 
Although significant as a means of providing same-sex couples with a route 
to parentage, the UPA (2017) continues to reinforce the societal assumption 
that a child may only have two legally recognized parents.  
A purely intent-based test has been criticized as implying that an intent 
to parent equates to the ability to parent, which is certainly not an accurate 
assumption.227 There are numerous examples of parents who had every 
intention of being a good and loving parent to a child but failed for one 
reason or another.228 Some states, such as New Hampshire and Virginia, 
have imposed measures to safeguard against potential dangers of intentional 
                                                                                                                     
223 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The majority in Sinnott agreed 
with the dissenting opinion that there was a great need for the legislature to act in this area of Vermont 
law. The majority’s discussion of the role of the court in defining parental doctrine helps to illustrate the 
tension that often arises between courts interpreting existing statutes and the constraints imposed by the 
lack of new legislation. It is imperative that legislatures update parental legislation so as to enable courts 
to fully adjudicate these claims. Sinnott, 180 A.3d at 573–74.  
224 Joslin, supra note 81, at 603–04. 
225 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
226 Id. § 302. 
227 Hurwitz, supra note 76, at 143.  
228 See id. at 144 (“There are alarming examples underscoring this point. Recently, a surrogate 
mother brought wrongful death and survival actions against a surrogacy clinic after the clinic’s client, a 
sperm donor and commissioning parent, repeatedly abused and eventually murdered the child born of the 
surrogacy. In New York, a father was convicted of first-degree manslaughter in the brutal homicide of 
his six-year-old adopted daughter.” (footnotes omitted)).   
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parentage. These measures include judicially pre-approving surrogacy 
contracts and imposing home studies of intended parents to “determine 
suitability for parenthood.”229 Notably, such fitness inquiries are not 
required of a heterosexual couple who conceive outside of an assisted 
process.230 While providing safeguards for children is a strong state interest, 
lawmakers must also be cautious not to over-burden same-sex intentional 
parents who lack the protection of a contractual agreement indicating their 
intent to parent. 
By adopting the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage provision 
under the UPA (2017), Connecticut would be setting same-sex couples up 
for success. This particular provision would allow for pre-birth planning, 
which would promote thoughtful and intentional family formation that 
would reduce the chances of litigation during the child’s life. It would 
promote both parental interests in control and custody of their children as 
well as the child’s best interests due to the increased chance of permanency 
and consistency in the child’s life. This intentional approach will not address 
all custody obstacles facing same-sex couples, and parents more broadly. 
Particularly, it is important to consider how to approach parentage when the 
child’s parent may not have been an intended parent pre-birth but certainly 
functions as a parent in the child’s life.  
D. Functional Parentage 
The UPA (2017) outlines a functional, de facto parentage provision.231 
This embodies what many states already do to recognize functional 
parent-child relationships. Section 609 of the UPA allows for individuals 
who stand in parity with legally recognized parents (regardless of biological 
relation) to be recognized as parents.232 The de facto parent doctrine differs 
from the holding out provision in as much as it allows claims of parentage 
to be brought at different times in the child’s life.233 In order to bring a claim 
under the holding out provision, one must have held the child out as one’s 
own since the child’s birth.234 However, both de facto parentage and the 
holding out provision require the existence of an ongoing parent-child 
relationship but embody different relationships in regard to when they came 
to be.235 
When considering a claim of de facto parentage, the court may consider 
a series of factors as outlined by the UPA (2017). These factors include 
                                                                                                                     
229 Id. at 144–45.  
230 See id. at 145 (discussing the applicability of such fitness inquiries only in the contexts of 
adoption and surrogacy).  
231 Joslin, supra note 81, at 601–02. 
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whether the alleged parent: (1) “resided with the child as a regular member 
of the child’s household for a significant period”; (2) “engaged in consistent 
caretaking of the child”; (3) “undertook full and permanent responsibilities 
of a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation”; (4) 
“held out the child as the individual’s child”; (5) “established a bonded and 
dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature”; (6) had 
this bonded and dependent relationship with the child that was “fostered or 
supported” by another parent of the child; and (7) has a relationship with the 
child, the continuation of which would be in the best interest of the child.236 
There are examples of de facto parentage that can help to illustrate the 
implications of enacting such a provision. Delaware, for example, describes 
that when a legal parent 
“foster[s] the formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship between the child and the de facto parent,” 
parental status can be established by a showing that the de 
facto parent “exercised parental responsibility for the child” 
and “acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to 
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the 
child that is parental in nature.”237 
While Delaware has not adopted the UPA (2017), its de facto parentage 
provision seems to echo similar factors that are outlined in the UPA (2017). 
De facto parentage can address situations beyond the context of same-sex 
couples including stepparents, grandparents, and cohabitating partners.238 
New York approached de facto parentage from common law, rather than 
legislation. Relevant caselaw illustrates the implications of enacting a 
functional parentage doctrine. By examining these cases both advantages 
and consequences of enacting functional parentage become clear. Brooke 
S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.239 altered the definition of parent in New York.240 
During this case, LGBT advocates at the Sanctuary for Families argued for 
the adoption of an intent-based test that would act as an “equality measure” 
                                                                                                                     
236 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
237 Douglas NeJaime, The Story of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.: Parental Recognition in the 
Age of LGBT Equality, in REPRODUCTION RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES (Melissa Murray et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2019) (preliminary draft at 13) (on file with author) [hereinafter NeJaime, The Story] 
(quoting DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 8–201(c) (2017)). 
238 Id.  
239 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016). 
240 From 1991 until 2016, New York operated on a narrow definition of parent. This was based on 
the holding in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), in which the court held that a partner 
in an unmarried relationship was not considered the child’s “parent” for purposes of seeking custody or 
visitation when that partner was not married to a biological parent or biologically related to the child 
themselves. It was not until 2016, with the case of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.A.C., that this definition 
changed. NeJaime, The Story, supra note 237, at 11–12. 
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for same-sex parents.241 However, in their brief, Sanctuary for Families also 
cautioned against a more functional approach, describing it as “overbroad” 
and requiring too much of a “case-by-case analysis [that] would empower 
former abusive partners with no biological or adoptive connection to a child 
to claim parental rights as a way to continue threatening their victims.”242 In 
the case of Brooke S.B., the court applied an intent-based test without fully 
foreclosing the possibility of applying a functional definition.243  
Despite the words of caution by Sanctuary for Families, many LGBTQ 
advocates call for a functional definition of parentage. Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) declares: “We believe (as with ducks) 
that if it looks like a family, if it holds itself out as a family, and if it functions 
like a family, then it is a family.”244 By allowing individuals who already 
function as a parent in a child’s life to bring forth a claim of parentage, the 
Connecticut legislature would be furthering the goal of protecting children 
and keeping families intact. However, the legislature must be cautious when 
drafting functional definitions of parentage. The concerns expressed by 
Sanctuary for Families should not be ignored. 
Professor Nancy Polikoff at the American University Washington 
College of Law, echoes concerns regarding purely functional parentage 
definitions and provides the example of an Oregon statute245 that attempts to 
provide a functional avenue to parentage.246 The statute allows anyone who 
“has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a 
child” to petition for custody or visitation.247 While this particular statute 
may allow nonbiological lesbian mothers a path to parentage, Polikoff 
cautions that this particular statute is over-broad in its application.248 While 
advocating for a functional approach to parentage, Polikoff criticizes the 
Oregon Supreme Court for its interpretation of this particular statute as not 
focusing enough on the intent to parent and instead on the parental function 
alone.249 Polikoff points out the advantages of including both function and 
                                                                                                                     
241 NeJaime, The Story, supra note 237, at 17. 
242 Id. at 17–18.   
243 Id. at 19.  
244 Katharine K. Baker, Quacking Like a Duck? Functional Parenthood Doctrine and Same-Sex 
Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 135 (2017). 
245 Polikoff, supra note 59, at 487 (“If the court determines that custody, guardianship, right of 
visitation, or other generally recognized right of a parent or person in loco parentis, is appropriate in the 
case, the court shall grant such custody, guardianship, right of visitation or other right to the person 
having the child-parent relationship, if to do so is in the best interests of the child.”) (citing OR. REV. 
STAT. § 109.119(1) (1989)). 
246 Polikoff, supra note 59, at 486–87. 
247 Id. at 486 (citation omitted). 
248 Id. at 488 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1989)). 
249  
There is little mention of this amendment in the committee minutes and no mention 
of its effect on the custodial rights of natural parents. Although we have no occasion 
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intention in a definition of parentage, thus promoting a balance between 
parental rights and the best interests of the child.250 
Concerns that purely functional definitions of parentage are generally 
messy and hard to apply is a sentiment that warrants consideration.251 A 
solely functional definition leaves too much discretion to the judiciary to 
decide what a functioning parent looks like.252 For example, another New 
York case following Brooke S.B. illustrates that a de facto parentage 
definition does have serious implications for parents. The case, K.G. v. 
C.H.,253 concerned a lesbian couple who considered adoption of a child 
during their relationship. The relationship came to an end, and Circe 
Hamilton (C.H.), the defendant, continued with the adoption process without 
Kelly Gunn (K.G.), adopting a child approximately a year after the break 
up.254 Thus, K.G. is distinguishable from Brooke in that the parties’ 
intentions in the case are far less clear than in Brooke, where they were 
beyond dispute.255  
After the adoption, Gunn remained in both the child’s and Hamilton’s 
lives, however, the trial court found that the mutual intention to adopt and 
raise a child ended when the romantic relationship ceased.256 Upon 
Hamilton’s decision to move, with the child, to Europe for work, Gunn 
brought an action claiming she was a parent of the child with standing to 
                                                                                                                     
to decide its effect on the issue presented by this case, we note that the language used 
is at least in some respects wholly consistent with this court’s previous decisions in 
child custody disputes between natural parents and others. In such disputes, it would 
never be proper to give custody to someone other than a natural parent unless custody 
in the other person best served the child’s interests. The ambiguity of the sentence lies 
in whether it would allow a court to deny custody to a natural parent if custody in 
another would best serve the child’s interests. The answer turns on whether the 
language “is appropriate in the case” calls for consideration of the custodial rights of 
natural parents.  
Polikoff, supra note 59, at 488. 
250   
Courts or legislatures looking for guidance in developing a new definition of 
parenthood would best serve the interests of children by focusing on two criteria: the 
legally unrelated adult’s performance of parenting functions and the child’s view of 
that adult as a parent. Courts would also protect the interests of legal parents in 
parental autonomy by focusing on the actions and intent of those parents in creating 
additional parental relationships.  
Id. at 490–91. 
251 See Baker, supra note 244, at 135–36 (discussing potential problems with a purely functional 
approach to parentage).  
252 Id. at 135.  
253 163 A.D.3d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).  
254 Ian Parker, What Makes a Parent?, NEW YORKER (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/22/what-makes-a-parent.   
255 K.G., 163 A.D.3d at 78. 
256 Id. at 76–77.  
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seek custody and visitation.257 The court noted that “equitable estoppel 
concerns whether a child has a bonded and de facto parental relationship 
with a nonbiological, nonadoptive adult. The focus is and must be on the 
child. It is for this reason that the child’s point of view is crucial whenever 
equitable estoppel is raised.”258 While there was no preadoption plan 
indicating an intent to parent,259 the court found the record inadequate to rule 
on the applicability of equitable estoppel grounds and thus remanded the 
case for further proceedings.260 
The UPA (2017) addresses many of the aforementioned concerns by 
weaving considerations of intent into a functional definition of parentage. 
Furthermore, few advocates and courts, if any, have called for a purely 
functional approach to parentage.261 For example, in 1995, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court adopted the de facto parentage doctrine, under which the first 
factor to be considered was intent.262  
Despite being known as the quintessential functional parent 
test, the first element listed by Wisconsin goes to intent, not 
function. The biological or adoptive parent must “consent[] to 
. . . the establishment of a parent-like relationship.” The Court 
explained that consent was important in order to “protect[] 
parental autonomy and the constitutional rights” of the 
biological or adoptive parent.263 
The two doctrines are not in conflict. After all, it would be difficult for 
one to function as a parent without also intending to be a parent, even if that 
intention was not present at the outset of the child’s life.  
E. The Advantages of Adopting Both Functional and Intentional 
Definitions of Parentage in Connecticut 
Defining relationships based on their function or an individual’s intent 
is not necessarily a novel concept. Function has become a determinative 
factor, or at least a persuasive one, in a wide range of contexts. Even in 
popular children’s literature the concept of functional parentage has made 
an appearance.264 Beyond books, functional relationships have more 
                                                                                                                     
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 82–83 (citation omitted).   
259 Id. at 73.  
260 Id. at 84. 
261 Baker, supra note 244, at 136. 
262 Id. at 145. 
263 Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
264 Horton Hears a Who represents what it means to truly intend to be a parent. Horton takes it upon 
himself to sit on Mayzie Bird’s egg until it hatches. When Mayzie returns claiming that hatchling to be 
hers and not Horton’s, it is true that Mayzie’s claim is that which is traditionally recognized by the courts 
as she is the egg’s biological parent. However, something interesting happens. The egg hatches and shares 
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generally been recognized in the tenancy context, as illustrated by Braschi 
v. Stahl Associates.265 The court in Braschi found that cohabitating same-sex 
partners were to be included under the statute’s definition of family so as to 
protect the surviving partner from eviction in the event of the named tenant 
dying.266 The court came to this conclusion by objectively examining the 
totality of the couple’s relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring, 
and self-sacrifice within the relationship.267 The court considered the 
exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the parties’ emotional and 
financial commitment to one another, their reliance on one another, and how 
they held themselves out to society.268 These considerations go beyond the 
factual inquiry of whether the couple was married and fully encompasses the 
function and intention of their relationship. By considering the relationship 
in its entirety, the court was able to see that the couple fit within what the 
legislature intended when referring to family in this context.269 
Leading up to the Supreme Court’s finding in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
courts expressed frustration with the limitations of the biological 
construction of family. In Perry v. Brown,270 Judge Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit dismissed the “argument that the purpose of marriage is ‘to 
encourage child-rearing environments where parents care for their biological 
children in tandem.’”271 The court further questioned the need for biological 
ties when “family is about raising children and not just about producing 
them.”272 In that particular case, the court “elevated functional parenting 
over procreative sex, gender, and biology.”273 Further, prior to the 
recognition of same-sex marriage, many opponents of its recognition would 
point to the intention of same-sex couples to have children as a reason for 
why same-sex marriage was unnecessary.274 In resisting and disregarding 
these arguments, courts were reluctant to make distinctions between 
different-sex procreation and assisted reproduction, implicitly signaling 
                                                                                                                     
features with Horton the elephant, implying that Horton’s intentions and functions as a parent had an 
impact on his claim of parentage. For a full discussion of this analogy, see Woodhouse, supra note 74, 
at 1749–51.  
265 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
266 Id. at 54.  
267 Id. at 55.  
268 Id. 
269 See id. at 211 (“The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious 
legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life.”).  
270 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013). 
271 See NeJaime, supra note 92, at 1238 (quoting Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir. 
2014)). 
272 Id. (quoting Baskin, 766 F.3d at 663). 
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acceptance of intentional parenting as a component of marital and functional 
parenting.275  
A small number of courts have adopted a more explicitly functional 
approach to parentage. They have done this by applying the doctrine of in 
loco parentis.276 This doctrine has its roots in common law and creates 
parental rights and responsibilities in individuals who voluntarily provide 
support for or take over custodial duties of a child.277 When these courts are 
making their determinations, intent is a crucial consideration.278 Historically, 
this doctrine often arises in the context of stepparents.279 Beyond the general 
consideration of whether there is a parent-child relationship, courts 
operating under this doctrine will grant custody, visitation, or other parental 
rights if it is in the best interests of the child.280 Intentional parentage is 
distinct from functional parentage in so much as it addresses planned family 
formation.281 However, intent is an important consideration in functional 
parentage.282 It therefore makes sense for Connecticut to adopt both the 
voluntary acknowledgment of parentage (intentional) and de facto 
(functional) parentage provisions of the UPA (2017) so as to fully reflect the 
complexity of parent-child relationships.283 This is further supported by the 
reality that intentional parentage is a narrower prospective doctrine, and de 
facto parentage a broader, more retrospective doctrine.284 Both provisions of 
the UPA (2017) were designed to protect parent-child relationships, and 
Connecticut’s adoption of these provisions would be significant in moving 
towards protecting children and their parent-child relationships, particularly 
in the context of same-sex couples seeking parental recognition.285 
                                                                                                                     
275 Id.  
276 Glennon, supra note 65, at 590. 
277 Polikoff, supra note 59, at 502.  
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279 Id. at 507–08. 
280 For an example of a statutory scheme that outlines this, see id. at 487 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. 
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281 NeJaime, The Story, supra note 237, at 2. 
282 See id. at 13–14 (describing how intentional and functional approaches to parenthood often 
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284 NeJaime, The Story, supra note 237, at 14. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law should recognize the insiders in a child’s life even when they 
do not fit the nuclear or exclusive model of parent, especially when the child 
considers them to be an insider.286 While national and local origins of family 
law are entrenched in heteronormative and exclusive models, this does not 
have to dictate the future of family law in Connecticut. Non-traditional 
families have driven a significant amount of parental doctrine development 
thus far and they will continue to do so.287 Given the strides Connecticut has 
made to advance state laws to be more inclusive, it is time for the legislature 
to enact the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage and de facto 
provisions of the UPA (2017). 
As previously discussed in this Note, there are concerns that allowing 
nonbiologically-related individuals to bring forth claims of parentage will 
lead to an excess of claims and ultimately be harmful to children. Studies 
have shown that there is no difference in quality of attachment between 
adoptive and natural mothers and their children.288 Furthermore, redefining 
parentage in functional and intentional terms would not erase the biological 
or contractual parent-child relationships that have long enjoyed recognition.  
By adopting the UPA (2017), there would be clear guidelines as to who may 
bring a claim and what is required in order to be considered a parent. Parental 
relationships would be analyzed under a functional and intentional approach. 
While not harming biological relationships, this new approach to parentage 
will validate many parent-child relationships that have been denied that 
respect and security for years.289  
Critiques and general reluctance to adopt the UPA (2017) reflect the 
complex nature of parental rights. Unlike other rights enjoyed throughout 
this country, parental rights are granted to one individual usually at the cost 
of another.290 This is a framework that must be broken. Instead of forcing 
                                                                                                                     
286 Kavanagh, supra note 47, at 130.  
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families to exist in an unrealistic and contrived paradigm of a two-parent 
household, it is time for a reconsideration of how family and parent are 
defined. Beyond simply who can be a parent, it is important to challenge and 
question why only two individuals may have a bite at the apple. If a child 
has more than two parent-child relationships, but only two may be fully 
legally recognized, the best interests of the child seem to be in peril. Family 
law, particularly around parentage and custody, must adjust its focus and 
become re-centered on the individual to which all parties involved claim to 
have great care and attachment: the child.  
The potential for Connecticut to move away from the heteronormative 
and restrictive definitions of parentage would greatly benefit same-sex 
couples, their children, and non-normative families in Connecticut. It would 
place children and their interests back in the foreground and highlight the 
importance of examining the parent-child relationship as a whole. If 
Connecticut adopts the voluntary acknowledgement of parentage and de 
facto parentage provisions of the UPA (2017), courts would be given the 
option to consider intentional and functional factors of parentage.291 The 
UPA (2017) was not intended to eliminate genetic or biological ties; instead 
it makes clear that while important, biological ties do not presumptively 
trump other indications of a parent-child relationship.292 These new avenues 
to parentage would protect children and same-sex parents whose 
relationships are at risk under present law. While there are consequences to 
including these definitions, the protection this would offer to parent-child 
relationships and same-sex parents can no longer be ignored. The legislature 
needs to recognize the vulnerability of same-sex parents in Connecticut and 
act accordingly by adopting both the voluntary acknowledgment of 
parentage and de facto parentage provisions of the UPA (2017). Not only 
will this protect same-sex individuals’ parental rights but it will protect 
important parent-child relationships so that a child is not punished for the 
composition of their family. 
 
                                                                                                                     
291 See Joslin, supra note 81, at 605 (noting that this would not eliminate the importance of other 
parent-child relationships).   
292 Id. 
